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Abstract
The  threat  on  the  survival  of  animal  species  due  to  intensive  use  of  natural
resources  is  incorporated  within  resource  management  models,  paying  special
attention  to  uncertainty  regarding  the  conditions  that  lead  to  extinction.  The
manner  in  which  the  potential  benefits  forgone  due  to  the  species  extinction
(denoted  extinction  penalty)  induce  more  conservative  exploitation  policies  is
studied  in  detail.  When  the  extinction  penalty  is  ignored,  the  optimal  policy
is  to  drive  the  resource  stock  to  a  particular  equilibrium  level  from  any
initial  state.  When  the  extinction  penalty  is  considered  and  the  conditions
that  lead  to  extinction  are  not  fully  understood  (i.e.,  involve  uncertainty),
an  interval  of  equilibrium  states  is  identified,  which  depends  on  the  penalty
and  the  immediate  extinction  risk.
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I.  Introduction
In  August  1973,  the  $100  million  Tellico  dam  was  almost  complete  when  a
University  of Tennessee  zoologist  discovered  that  the  Little  Tennessee  River  (soon
to  be  turned  into  a  reservoir)  is  home  to  the  snail  darter-a  previously  unknown
species.  At  the  same  year,  the  Endangered  Species  Act  (ESA)  was  enacted  to
protect  endangered  (under risk  of extinction)  and threatened  (likely  to  become
endangered  in the  foreseeable  future)  species.  The  snail  darter  was  soon  enlisted
as  endangered  and  a  lawsuit  (Hill  v.  Tennessee  Valley  Auth.)  was  filed against  the
Tennessee  Valley  Authority  that  owned  the  dam.  Observing  that  "Congress...had
chosen  the  snail  darter  over  the  dam,"  the  Supreme  Court  had  no  choice  but  to  rule
against  Tellico  (Littell,  1992,  p.  3),  turning  the  incomplete  dam  into  a  giant
monument  of the  "extinction  vs.  coexistence"  dilemma  and  changing  forever  the
landscape  of wildlife  protection  law.
The  Tellico  project  remained  in limbo  until  rescued  by  Congress  in  1978.  The
1978  amendments  to  the  ESA  directed  the  Secretary  of the  Interior  to  designate  a
"critical  habitat"  to  newly  enlisted  species  and  to consider  economic  impacts
(Littell,  1992,  p.  11).  An  important  provision  of the  amendments  allows  for
exemption  of a  federal  project  from  the  Act  if it  is  determined  (by  a  cabinet-
level  Endangered  Species  Committee)  that  "...the  benefits  of the proposed  federal
actions  clearly  outweigh  the  benefits  of preserving  the  species."  (US-GAO,  1992,
p.  8).  It  is  with  this  amendment  in mind  that we  set  to  study  the  exploitation  of
a  natural  resource  that  serves  a  dual  purpose:  first,  it  serves  human  needs  and  is
therefore  exploited  for  beneficial  use  (however  defined);  second,  it  serves  as  a
habitat  for  an  animal  population  whose  existence  depends  on  adequate  quality  and
quantity  of the  resource,  without  which  the  species  faces  an  extinction  risk.
1The  Tellico  story  has  a  happy  end:  The  dam  was  exempted  from  the  Act  and
completed  in  1979;  soon  after,  the  snail  darter  was  found  in other  rivers,  where
it  flourishes  today,  and  was  reclassified  as  threatened.  But  a  Tellico-like
situation,,  in  which  resource  exploitation  for human  needs  comes  at the  expense  of
habitats  essential  for  the  existence  of other  species,  is  often  encountered  and
will  become  more  pervasive  as  the  competition  for  the  world's  finite  resources
grows  fiercer  with  the  growing  human population  compounded  with  a  rising  standard
of  living.
* In  California,  water  diversion  from  the  Sacramento  and  San Joaquin  Rivers
had  been  restricted  to  protect  fish  and  wildlife  in  the  Delta  Estuary  (Fisher,
Hanemann  and  Keeler,  1990).  Coming  at  the  expense  of water  entitlements  for  farms
and  cities  in  the  Central  Valley  and  Southern  California,  these  restrictions  lead
to  intense  political  struggles  between  environmentalists,  farmers  and  city
dwellers.
* In North  America,  the  American  Fisheries  Society  lists  364  species  of fish
as  endangered  or threatened,  most are  at risk  due  to  habitat destruction.  Only
four  adult  Snake  River  sockeye  salmon  managed  to  reach  their  spawning  ground  in
1991,  swimming  from  the  Pacific  Ocean,  through  eight  dams  in  the  Columbia  River
basin,  to Idaho's  Redfish  Lake  (Apostol,  1993).
* Reclamation  of swamps  and  wetlands  comes  at  the  expense  of habitats  for
migrating  birds,  some  of which  are  already  on the  Endangered  List  (Weitzman,
1993).
* At  the  current  rate,  a forest  area  about  the  size  of England  is  being
cleared  every  year  (Hartwick,  1992),  leading  to  the  extinction  of incalculable
number  of species  (Colinvaux,  1989).
* In  1988,  the  world  population  of the  Chinese  river  dolphin,  found  primarily
2in  the  Yangtze  River  in  east  central  China,  was  estimated  at 300  individuals.  The
population  decline  is attributed  in  part to  river construction  (Thompson,  1988).
In the  above  examples  the  species  under  extinction  risk  may  not contribute
directly  to  human  well  being,  yet  a  benefit  is  assigned  to  their  very  existence  -
a  benefit  often  referred  to  as  existence  or nonuse  value.  The  species  may  also
contribute  to  recreational  activities,  so  elimination  entails  the  loss  of a
recreational  option,  and their  survival  contributes  to  biodiversity  (Weitzman
[1992,  1993];  Polasky,  Solow  and  Broadus  [1993]).  While  economists  may  disagree
on how  to  measure  such  extra-market  benefits  (Hausman  [1993];  Hanemann  [1994]),
the  notion  that preserving  genetic  diversity  is  desirable  commands  a  wide
consensus  (about  one  half  of medicine  prescriptions  originate  from  organisms  found
in  the  wild  [Littell,  1992,  p.  5,  Bird,  1991]).
In this  study  we  incorporate  extinction  risk  within  resource  management
models,  paying  special  attention  to  uncertainty  regarding  the  conditions  that  lead
to  extinction.  As  a  metaphor,  we  consider  an  animal  species  that  requires  a
minimal  level  of the  resource  stock  to  maintain  its  livelihood.  Below  this
critical  level  the  species  is doomed  to  extinction.  The  critical  level  at  which
extinction  occurs  is incompletely  known,  reflecting  our partial  ignorance  of the
species  ecology.
We  investigate  how  the  threat  on  the  existence  of an  animal  population  should
affect  the  way  nature  is exploited  for  human  needs.  We  shall  not  be  concerned
with  moral  or  ethical  issues  regarding  whether  or  not  to  preserve,  nor  shall  we
deal  with  how  to  measure  the  benefit  of preservation  (this  has  been  done  by
others,  of which  some  are  mentioned  above).  We  simply  assume  that  preservation  is
valuable  or,  alternatively,  that extinction  entails  a  penalty  represented  by  a
fine  (exogenously  determined)  to  be  incurred  at  the  time  extinction  occurs.  It  ishardly  surprising  that  the  size  of this  penalty  has  a  profound  effect  on  the
optimal  exploitation  policy,  though  less  obvious  is how  this effect  is manifested.
We  derive  below  the  precise  manner  in  which the  extinction  risk  and  penalty  affect
optimal  exploitation  policies.  This  should  help  focus  environmental  debates  on
the  main  issues,  away  from  groundless  rhetoric.
The  present  work  draws  on  the  analysis  of Tsur  and  Zemel  (1994a),  who  extended
earlier  works  of Cropper  (1976)  and  Heal  (1984)  to  study  groundwater  extraction
under  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  occurrence  of an  event  (such  as  salt  water
intrusion)  that  irreversibly  ruins  the  aquifer.  The  analysis  was  later  extended
to  consider  events  that  are  partly  reversible  (i.e.,  their  damage  can  be  fixed  at
a  cost)  and  used  to  incorporate  global  warming  risks  within  models  of fossil  fuel
usage  (Roe,  Tsur  and  Zemel,  1994;  Tsur  and  Zemel,  1994b).  The  present  effort
extends  the  partly  reversible  model  to  situations  where  resource  exploitation  for
human  needs  comes  into  conflict  with  other  species  survival.  The  extent  of
reversibility  is  different  in  the  present  model,  since,  apart  from  the  penalty,
event  occurrence  removes  further  extinction-related  constraints  on  future  plans.
Similarities  with  the  previous  models  allow  us  to  refer  to  the  above  mentioned
works  for  some  of the  more  technical  derivations.
II.  The  problem
To  be  concrete,  we  discuss the  problem  in  the  context  of a  water  stream  that
supports  a  wildlife  habitat  if  left  instream,  e.g.,  by  improving  spawning  of some
fish  population,  and  that  is  also  demanded  as  an  input  of production  by  irrigators
and  other  manufacturers.  Let  S  denote  the  state  of the  water  stream,  measured,
say,  by  the  water  level  at  some  crucial  point  along  the  river.  Net  natural
replenishment - inflows  from  surface  streams  and  springs  minus  outflows--is
represented  by  R(S),  and  off  stream  diversion  rate  is  denoted  by  g.  These  two
4processes  determine  the  time  evolution  of S:
dS/dt  St  =  R(S)  - gt.  (2.1)
At  the  state  level  S net  recharge  is nil,  i.e.,  R(S)  =  0.  The  cost  of
diverting  g  at  the  state  S is C(S)g,  where  C(S)  is  the  unit  diversion  cost,  and
the  benefit  of consuming  g  is Y(g).  The  net  benefit  of consuming  g  at the  level  S
is  Y(g)-C(S)g.
The  following  assumptions  are  made:  (i)  R(S)  is decreasing  and  concave;  (ii)
C(S)  is  non-increasing  and  convex;  and  (iii)  Y(g)  is increasing  and  strictly
concave  with  Y(0)  =  0.  The  properties  of C  and  Y  are  common.  The  properties  of R
are  typical  of a  resource  stock  that  is recharged  from  exogenous  sources  (i.e.,
does  not reproduce  itself),  such  as  a  water  stream.
An  exploitation  policy  (or plan)  consists  of the  extraction  process  gt  and  the
associated  state  process  St,  t  2 0.  A  plan  is  feasible  if,  for  all  t,  gt  is
piecewise  continuous  and  nonnegative,  and  St  > 0.
Excessive  off stream  diversion  may  lead  to  species  extinction.  To  retain
simplicity,  we  assume  that  only  one  species  is at risk.  When  extinction  occurs,  a
penalty  of  size  \  is inflicted  and  the  exploitation  process  proceeds  thereafter
with  no  further  extinction  risk.  The  penalty  y, represents  benefits  forgone  due  to
extinction  and  is  treated  here  as  an  exogenous  parameter.
Let  VP(S)  denote  the  post-event  value  function,  starting  from  So  =  S.  Since
no  further  risk  is  to  be  considered  after  occurrence,  VP(S)  is given  by
Co
VP(S)  =  Max  f[Y(g)-C(St)gJe-P tdt  (2.2)
{gJ}
subject  to:  St  =  R(St)-gt,  gt  2  0,  St 2 0  and  So  =  S,  where  p  is  the  time  rate  of
discount.  VP(S)  is  also  the  value  corresponding  to  the  pre-event  problem  with  no
extinction  penalty  (i.e.,  when  W =  0).Let  X represent  the  minimum  state  level  of the  resource  required  to maintain  a
viable  population:  when  S  falls  below  X,  the  extinction  event  occurs.  Suppose
that  X  is  known  with  certainty  and  the  event  has  not  yet  occurred  (i.e.,  So  >  X)
and  let VC(So,X)  denote  the  corresponding  value  function.  The  case  VC(X,X),  when
So  =  X,  is  of particular  interest,  because  the  planner  must  decide  immediately
whether  to  cross  the  critical  level,  enjoying  the  benefit  VP(X)-y,  or to  stay  at
or  above  it,  avoiding  the  penalty.  The  conditions  for  either  decision  are
analyzed  in the  next  section,  and the  corresponding  optimal  benefit  (p(X)  =  VC(X,X)
is  derived.
The  problem  when  X  is  known  with  certainty  can now  be  formulated  in  terms  of
(p(X).  Let  T  >  0  be  the  first  time  the  state  process  reaches  the  level  X (if X  is
never  encountered,  T  =  oo).  Then,
T
Vc(S,X)  =  Max  f[Y(gt)-C(St)ge-Ptdt  +  e-PT(X)  (2.3)
{gt,T}  0
subject  to:  St  =  R(St)-gt,  gt  2  0,  St  >  X,  ST  =  X  (if T  <  oo),  So  =  S  >  X.
The  critical  state  level  needed  to  maintain  a  viable  population  is  in general
incompletely  known  and  can  be  specified  only  in terms  of the  distribution  and
density  functions  F(S)  =  Pr{X<S}  and  f(S)  =  dF/dS.  The  distribution  F  is  assumed
to  be  continuously  differentiable  over  [S,S],  where  S  2  0  is  the  highest  instream
level  at  which  extinction  is  bound  to  occur.
Under  this  type  of uncertainty,  it  is  convenient  to  let  X  represent  the  state
level  at  which  the  event  occurs,  so  that  T becomes  the  occurrence  date.  The
distribution  on  X  induces  a  distribution  on  the  occurrence  time  T  as well.  Given
that  the  event  has  not  yet  occurred,  we  search  for  the  exploitation  policy
corresponding  to
6T
V(So)  =  Max  E  f[Y(g)-C(SJ  dt  +  e-pT  p(ST)-  I T>o0  (2.4)
{g'}  f
subject  to  St  =  R(St-gt,  gt 2  0,  St  2 0,  and  So  given.  In  (2.4),  Er represents
expectation  with  respect  to  the  distribution  of T.  We  assume  that  an  optimal
solution  exists.
As  the  process  evolves  in time,  our  assessment  of the  distributions  of X  and T
is  modified,  as  X  must  lie  below  St  =  Min  {ST}.  The  expected  benefit  (2.4),
T E  [0o,t]
thus,  involves  St  which  depends  on  all  history  to  time  t,  unless  St  evolves
monotonically  in time,  in  which  case  St  =  St  or  St  =  So  if St  is  non-increasing  or
St is  non-decreasing,  respectively.  It  turns  out  (see  Appendix  A  for a proof)
that:
Property 2.1:  At  least  one  of the  optimal S-trajectories  corresponding  to  (2.4)
evolves  monotonically  in  time.
We  therefore  restrict  attention  to  monotonic  trajectories.
For non-decreasing  S  trajectories,  it  is  known with  certainty  that  the  event
will  never  occur  and  the  exploitation  problem  reduces  to  (2.2).  For non-
increasing  state  processes,  the  distribution  of T  is  given  by
l-FT(t)  = Pr{T>t  T>0}  =  Pr{X<StIX<So}  =  F(St)/F(So)  (2.5)
with  the  density  fr(t)  =  dF,(t)/dt  =  f(S)[gt-R(S)]/F(So).  The  hazard  rate
associated  with  T  is  fT(t)/[l-FT(t)]  =  X(St)[gt-R(S)],  where
X(S)  - f(S)/F(S).  (2.6)
It  is  assumed  that  h(S)  is  non-increasing.
Express  the  expectation  in  (2.4) as
oo
owith  I(.)  =  1 or  I(.)  =  0  when  its argument  is true  or false,  respectively.  Since
ET{I(T>t)  T> 0}  =  1-F,(t)  =  F(S)/F(So),  the  objective  function  for  non-increasing
trajectories  becomes
00
f{Y(gt)-C(St)gt +(S)[gt-R(St)][VP(St)-V]}e -pt  F  dt.  (2.7)
o
The  allocation  problem  for  which  (2.7)  is  the  objective  is  denoted  the auxiliary
problem.  It is  verified  in  Appendix  A  that  the  optimal  state  processes
corresponding  to the  post-event  and  auxiliary  problems  evolve  monotonically  in
time.
In  the  following  section  we  use  the  optimal  post-event  plan  to  characterize
the  optimal  exploitation  policy  under  certainty--when  the  critical  state  level  X
is  completely  known.  Using  the  optimal  state  processes  of the  post-event  problem
and  of the  auxiliary  problem,  we  characterize,  in Section  4,  the  exploitation
policy  under  uncertainty--when  X  is  known up  to  a  probability  distribution.
HI.  Certainty
The  post-event  value  function  VP(S)  plays  important  roles  in both  the
certainty  and  uncertainty  problems:  it  affects  the  allocation  problem  under
certainty  in  that  it determines  the  terminal  value  (p(X)  at  time  T  (see  Eq.  (2.3)),
and  it directly  enters  the  uncertainty  objective  function  (see  Eq.  (2.7)).  The
post  event  problem  is  similar  to  the  certainty  problem  analyzed  in  Tsur  and  Zemel
(1994a).  We  summarize  below  its  main  properties.  A  differential  equation  for  the
evolution  of the  optimal  extraction  rate  is  presented  in  Appendix  B.  The  value
function  VP(S)  is  calculated  given  the  optimal  extraction  trajectory.
Define  J(S)  =  (S)R(S)  and  L(S)  =  [p-R'(S)][Y'(R(S))-C(S)-J(S)],  and  let  S
be  the  state  level  satisfying
8S  =  0  if L(O)  >  0
)  = S  if L(S)  <  0 *  (3.1)
L(  =  0  otherwise
Since  p-R'(S)  >  0,  the  roots  of L(S)  are  the  same  as  the  roots  of Y'(R(S))-C(S)-
J(S).  The  properties  of Y,  R and  C  ensure  that  the  latter  function  increases  with
S,  hence  S  is  unique.  It  follows  (see  Appendix  B  and  Tsur  and  Zemel,  1994a),
that:
Property  3.1:  S  is  the  unique  steady  state  to  which  the  optimal  state  process
corresponding  to  the  post-event  problem  converges  from  any  initial  state.
At  equilibrium,  the  post-event  value  reduces  to  the equilibrium  benefit  W(S)
where  W(S)  =  [Y(R(S))-C(S)R(S)]/p.  Outside  equilibrium,  the  determination  of
VP(S)  requires  the  optimal  trajectory  (see  Appendix  B).
Turning  to  the  certainty  problem  (2.3),  where  the  critical  level  X  is  known  in
advance,  we  consider  initial  states  at  or  above  X,  for  otherwise  the  event  has
already  occurred  and  the  post-event  analysis  applies.
Next,  we  assert  that  the  optimal  state  process  Sc  cannot  decrease  when
starting  at  So  <  S.  For  if it  does,  the  monotonicity  of St  requires  it  to
approach  some  value  below  S.  However,  according  to  Property  3.1,  Sc  yields  a
lower  benefit  than  the  optimal  post-event  process  SP  (initiated  at the  same  level
So)  even when  Sc  carries  no  penalty.  Moreover,  the  non-decreasing  process  SP
yields  the  same  value  for  both  the  certainty  and  the  post-event  problems,  hence  it
must  be  optimal  for  the  former  problem  as  well.
For the  same  reason  it cannot  be  optimal  to  trigger  the  event  when  X  <  S.
Thus,  the  certainty  problem  may  differ  from  the  post-event  problem  only  when
S  <  X  <  So,  which  we  maintain  for  the  reminder  of this  section.
DefineS=  S  if VP(X)-W(X)  >  (3.2)
X  if V p(X)-W(X)  < N
(The  singular  case  VP(X)-W(X)  =  y  will  be  discussed  separately.)  We  show  that
Property  3.2:  When  S  <  X  _ So  and VP(X)-W(X)  `,  S  is  the  unique  steady  state  to
which  the  optimal  state  process  of the  certainty  problem  converges.
Proof:  Consider  any  state  S  >  X.  We  show  that  S  cannot  be  an  equilibrium  state
by  constructing  a  plan,  initiated  at S,  that yields  a  higher  value  than  the
equilibrium  benefit  W(S).  For  some  arbitrary  small  constants  h> 0  and  >0,  define
the  extraction plan,  starting  at  the  state  S
8h  R(S)  +  8,  0  t  <  h
gt ) h  (3.3)
t  R(Sh)  ,  th
When  the  product  h6  is  small  enough,  the  new  equilibrium  level  S h  lies  above  X  and
the  event  does  not  occur.  Under  these  conditions,  the  benefit  V  h(S)  associated
with  g8h  is  found  to  be  (Tsur  and  Zemel,  1994a):
vh(s) - W(S)  =  L(S)8h/p  +  o(6h).  (3.4)
Since  S  >  S,  L(S)  >  0  and  there  exist  h  >  0  and  6  >  0  such  that
V8h(S)-W(S)  >  0.  Thus,  the  steady  state  plan that  yields  the  value  W(S)  is  not
optimal,  ruling  out  the  possibility  that  S  is  a  steady  state.
A  state  S  <  X can  be  reached  only  during  the  post-event  period,  for  which
Property  3.1  implies  that  only  S  can be  a  steady  state.  It follows  that  only S  or
X  may  qualify  as  steady  states.  Now,  to  reach  S,  the  optimal  plan  must  pass
through  X.  While  at X,  it  is  always  possible  to  enter  a  steady  state  and  enjoy
the  benefit  W(X).  Proceeding  towards  S  entails  triggering  the  event and  enjoying
the  benefit  VP(X)-N.  Thus,  it  pays  to  proceed  to  S  if and  only  if
VP(X)-W(X)  >  V.,
10The  above  consideration  implies  that  if VP(X)-W(X)  =  W, both S  and  X  are
optimal  steady  states,  and  the  choice  between  the  processes  leading  to each  of
them  is  arbitrary.  This  singular  case  marks  the  transition  from  the  equilibrium
state  S,  typical  of the  post-event  (or penalty-free)  problem,  to  the  critical
level  X.  We  call  the  function  VP(X) -W(X)  the  implicit penalty.  When  the  actual
penalty  W exceeds  the  implicit  penalty,  extinction  cannot  be  optimal.
Since  the  steady-state  policy  is  always  available,  VP(S)  2  W(S),  equality
holding  at  the  equilibrium  state  S.  Hence,  also  VP'(S)  =  W'(S).  Above  S,  it  is
verified  in  Appendix  B,  the  implicit penalty  cannot  decrease:
VP'(S)  - W'(S)  2 0  for  all  S  >  S.  (3.5)
Thus,  populations  with  larger  critical  levels  X  require  higher  penalties  W to  be
saved  from  extinction.
In  view  of (2.3),  The  optimal  state  process  of the  certainty  problem  St  is
characterized  as  follows:
(i)  X  <  S:  Here,  St  =  SP,  which  is  the  optimal  state  process  of  the  post-event
problem.  In this  case  extinction  is  not  desirable  even  with  vanishing  penalty  and
the  certainty  solution  is  the  same  as  that  of the  post-event problem.
(ii)  S  <  X  5  So  and VP(X)-W(X)  ￿  W:  Here,  St,  t  e  [0,T],  and  T  are  found  by
solving
T
Vc(So,X)  =  Max  f[Y(gt)-C(St)g]e-Ptdt  +  e-PTW(X)
{g,,T}  o
subject  to  St  =  R(S)-gt,  gt  >  0  and  Sr  =  X.  For  t  2  T,  St  =  X.  In this  case  the
penalty  is  sufficiently  high  to  prevent  extinction,  and  <p(X)  =  W(X).
(iii)  S  <  X  <  So  and VP(X)-W(X)  >  \y:  Here,  St,  t  e  [0,T],  and  T are  found  by
solving
11T
V(So,X)  =  Max  f[Y(g)-C(St)gj]ePtdt  +  e-PT[VP(X)-M]
{gt,T}
subject  to  St  =  R(St)-g t,  gt  >  0,  and  ST  =  X.  For t  Ž  T,  St  is  the  same  as  S'
that  departs  from  X.  In  this  case  the  penalty  is  not  sufficiently  high  to  prevent
extinction,  and  <p(X)  =  VP(X)-y.
Under  certainty,  the  most  dramatic  effect  of inflicting  a  penalty  upon
extinction  is  seen  to  be  the  shift of the  equilibrium  state  from  S to  the  critical
level  X  when  the  extinction  penalty  W exceeds  the  implicit  penalty  VP(X)-W(X).  We
proceed  to  show,  in  the  following  section,  that under  event  uncertainty  the
penalty  effect  assumes  a  very  different  nature.
IV.  Uncertainty
In  characterizing  the  optimal  policy  of the  uncertainty  problem  (2.4)  we  make
use  of the  optimal  policies  of the  post-event  and  the  auxiliary  problems.  The
former  has  been  studied  above.  The  latter,  in  light  of (2.7),  is  formulated  as:
00
Va(S)  =  Max  {Y(gt)-C(St)gt+X(S)[gt-R(St)][VP(St)-]}e-pt  )  dt  (4.1)
{g'f  o
subject  to  St  =  R(St)-gt,  St 2  ,  gt  > 0,  and  So  2  S given.  As  will  soon  become
apparent,  the auxiliary  problem  is  relevant  only  for  state  levels  in  [S,S],  hence
the  constraint  St  2  S.
Define
Lw(S)  =  L(S)  +  pX(S)[VP(S)-W(S)-W]  (4.2)
where  it  is  recalled  that  L(S)  =  [p-R'(S)][Y'(R(S))-C(S)-J(S)].  Let  SW  be  some
equilibrium  state  of the  auxiliary  problem  (i.e.,  at  S  =  SW,  the  optimal  off-
stream  diversion  rate  corresponding  to  (4.1)  equals  R(S)  and  it  remains  at  this
level  forever).  Then,  following  the  analysis  of the  post-event  problem  (see
appendix  B),  it  is  verified  that:
12Property 4.1:  Any  equilibrium  state  Sy  of the  auxiliary  problem  satisfies:
S  = S  if L(S)  <  0 (4.3)
L(Sw)  = 0 otherwise
According  to  (4.3),  any  equilibrium  state  in  [S,S)  must  be  a  root of  Lw.  In this
respect,  the  function  Lw  generalizes  L(S)  of the  post-event  problem.  Indeed,
under  certainty,  when  X(S)  vanishes,  the  two  functions  coincide.  (Interestingly,
when  W vanishes,  i.e.,  when  extinction  entails  no penalty,  Lw  does  not reduce to
L,  but  satisfies  Lw  >  L,  equality  holding  when  S  =  S.  Therefore,  both  functions
have  the  same  unique  root  in  [S,S),  namely  S,  yielding  the  same  equilibrium
state.)
Can the  auxiliary  problem  admit  multiple  equilibria  in  [S,S]?  The  answer,  in
light  of Property  4.1,  depends  on whether  (4.3) has  more  than  one  solution.  It
turns  out  that  SW  of (4.3)  is  unique.  To  see  this,  differentiate  (4.2) to  obtain
L4(S)  =  L'(S)  +  pX'(S)[VP(S)-W(S)-y]  +  pX(S)[VP'(S)-W'(S)].  (4.4)
Recalling  that  VP(S)-W(S)  =  L(S)  =  0,  we  see  that  LW(S)  =  -pk(S)w  <  0,  assuming
that  both  W and  X(S)  are  positive.  Clearly,  for  states  S  >  S satisfying
VP(S)-W(S)  >  W, we  have  LW(S)  >  L(S)  >  0  and  such  states  cannot  be  roots  of Lw.
Thus,  attention  can  be  restricted  to  states  S  >  S  for  which  VP(S)-W(S)  <  w.  Now,
since  L(S)  is  increasing  and  X(S)  is  non-increasing,  the  sum  of the  first  two
terms  on  the  right-hand  side  of (4.4)  is  positive,  while  (3.5)  ensures  that  the
last term  is  nonnegative.  It  follows  that  Lw(S)  must  increase  in  the  relevant
interval,  and  there  exists  a  unique  state  level  SW  in  (S,S],  satisfying  (4.3).
Property  4.1,  then,  implies  that  SW  is  the  unique  equilibrium  state  of the
auxiliary  problem.  Being  monotonic  (cf. Appendix  A)  and  bounded,  the  optimal
state  trajectory  of  the  auxiliary  problem  (henceforth  denoted  St)  must  converge  to
an  equilibrium  state.  We  have  thus  established:
13Property 4.2:  SY  is  the  unique  steady  state  to  which  the  optimal  state  process
corresponding  to  the  auxiliary  problem  (4.1)  converges  from  any  initial  state  in
[S,S].
Note  the  similarity  of this  result  and  Property  3.1.  The  role  of VP(S)-W(S)-y
in  shifting  the  equilibrium  state  is obvious.  Unlike  the  certainty  problem,  the
equilibrium  state  does  not jump  abruptly  from  S  when  the  penalty  y  exceeds  the
implicit  penalty.  Rather,  the  auxiliary  equilibrium  state  Sv  changes  continuously
as  y  is  increased.
The  optimal  state  process  under  uncertainty can  now  be  characterized  using  the
optimal  processes  of the  post-event  and  auxiliary  problems  in  the  same  way  it  is
done  in  Tsur  and  Zemel  (1994a-b).  We  briefly  sketch  the  main  idea,  avoiding
technical  details  that  can  be  found  in these  works.  We  denote  by  St  the  optimal
state  process  under  uncertainty  and  recall  that  S,  and  St  are  the  optimal  state
processes  of the  post-event  and  auxiliary  problems.
First,  note  that  starting  at  S  _￿ S,  it  can  never  be  optimal  to  extract  above
recharge,  decreasing  S.  Such  a  policy  is  not  desirable  even  without  a  penalty  (SP
does  not decrease  when  it  lies  at or below  S).  Following  the  post-event  path,
then,  involves  no  occurrence  risk  (with  its  associated  penalty)  and  cannot  be
outperformed  by  some  decreasing  path  that  involves  a  positive  risk  of triggering
the  event  and  having  to  pay  the  penalty.  With  no  extinction  risk,  the optimal
plan  coincides  with  the  post-event  (or  certainty)  solution  and  St  =  SP.
Next,  observe  that  St  cannot  increase  when  departing  from  an  initial  state  at
or above  S.  This  is  so  because  for  the  post-event  problem,  the  steady  state
policy  yields  a  higher  benefit  than  any  increasing  plan starting  at  S  >  S.  Now,
uncertainty  does  not  affect  the  benefit  associated  with  nondecreasing  plans,  hence
the  steady  state  policy  outperforms  all  increasing  plans  under  uncertainty  as
14well,  and  St  cannot  increase.
It turns  out  that  St  decreases  when  it departs  from  S  >  Sm  and  it  is  in
equilibrium  when  initiated  at  S  e  [S,S,].  To  verify  the  former  requires  only
showing  that  states  for  which  S  >  S,  cannot  be  equilibrium  states.  This  is  done
by  comparing  the  value  V6h(S)  generated  by  the  extraction  plan  gsh  of (3.3)  with
the  equilibrium  benefit  W(S)  and  finding  that
Sh(s)  - W(S)  =  Lw(S)8h/p  +  o(8h).
(The  difference  with  (3.4)  is due,  of course,  to  occurrence  risk  during t<h.)
Since  LW(S)  >  0  for  S  >  Sw,  it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  value  higher  than  the
equilibrium  value  W(S)  (when  6h>0  is  small  enough).  Thus,  the  equilibrium  plan
cannot  be  optimal.
To  show  that  [S,S.]  consists  of the  equilibrium  points  of St,  requires  to  show
that  St  cannot  decrease  in  this  interval  (it  has  already  been  established  that  it
cannot  increase).  If St  decreases,  it  should  coincide  with  Sa.  But  below  Sm,  the
latter  is  increasing.  Thus,  St  cannot  decrease.
The  above  discussion  is  summarized  in
Property  4.3:  Let  St  be  the  optimal  process  corresponding  to  the  uncertainty
problem  (2.4).  Then:  (i)  St  increases  while  passing  through  S  levels  below  S;
(ii)  St  decreases  while  passing  through  S  levels  above  SA;  (iii)  the  interval
[S,S  ] consists  of  the  equilibrium  states  of St.
Indeed,  parts  (i)  and  (ii)  verify  our intuition  that  St  should  follow  the
auxiliary  path  when  it decreases  and  it  should  coincide  with  the  post-event
trajectory  when  it  increases.  Together,  parts  (i)  and  (ii)  imply  that  St
converges  to  the  boundaries  of the  equilibrium  interval  [S,Sm]  from  any  initial
state  outside  this  interval.  Entering  the  interval  cannot  be  optimal  because  the
15expected  loss  due  to  event  occurrence  outweighs  the  potential  gain.  The  optimal
state  process  under  uncertainty  is  now  completely  defined  in  terms  of the  optimal
process  SP  and  St.
Clearly,  the  equilibrium  interval  depends  on  the  difference  between  the
implicit  and  actual  penalties  and  on  the  extinction  risk  through  the  expected  loss
term  X(S)[VP(S)-W(S)-W].  In  fact,  for  a  very  high penalty,  when  LW(S)  <  0,  every
state  above  S  must  be  an  equilibrium  state,  and  the  policy  of extracting  above  the
recharge  rate  is  never  optimal.  Comparing  with  the  results  of the  certainty
problem,  the  dramatic  effect  of uncertainty  is  apparent:  rather  than  a  mere  shift
of the  equilibrium  state,  a  full  equilibrium  interval  emerges.  This  behavior  is
typical  of the  class  of problems  involving  uncertain  events  studied  by  Tsur  and
Zemel  (1994a,  1994b).
V.  Closing  Comments
Hardly  a  day  goes  by  without  one  reading  or hearing  about  some  environmental
disaster  creeping  at  our doorstep  or  a  natural  catastrophe  of that  sort  or another
soon  to  occur.  While  some  of these  alarms  turn  out to  be  premature  or  even  false,
others  pose  real  threats  on the  well-being  of the  living  species  on this  Earth,
and  even  more  so,  of future  generations.  It  appears  that  we  have  been  exploiting
our  natural  environment  beyond  its  regenerative  capacity,  leaving  a  lesser,
degraded  part  of  it from  year  to  year.  This  process  is  irreversible  to the  extent
that  parts  of the  environment  are  lost  forever.  The  possibility  of irreversible
losses  requires  prudent  management  because  mistakes  cannot  be  fixed.  This  is  the
essence  of the  "extinction  vs.  coexistence"  dilemma  considered  in  this  work.
As  so  much  is  at  stake,  environmental  debates  are  often  loaded  and  tend  to  be
long  on  emotion  and  short  on  economic  rationale.  Our  aim  in  this  work  is  to
contribute  some  to  the  latter:  We  offer  a  framework  for  analyzing  a  situation  in
16which  natural  resource  exploitation  may  lead  to  the  extinction of  other  species
that  do  not  contribute  directly  to  human  well-being.  The  species  very  existence,
however,  entails  a  biodiversity  value  as  well  as  other  "nonuse"  benefits,  hence
its  extinction  inflicts  an  economic  penalty.
When  the  extinction penalty  is  ignored,  the  optimal  policy  is  to  drive  the
resource  stock to  a  particular  equilibrium  state  (S)  from  any  initial  state.  When
the  penalty  is considered  and  the  state  at  which  extinction  occurs  is  known  (and
lies  above  S),  extinction  occurs  only  if the  benefit  associate  with  it  (penalty
included)  exceeds  the  benefit  of maintaining  the  resource  state just  above  the
extinction  level.
Extinction  conditions,  however,  are  often  incompletely  known  and  may  be
specified  in  terms  of a  probability  distribution  on  the  critical  state  level
needed  to  maintain  the  species.  For  this  case,  we  identify  an  interval  of
equilibrium  states  whose  lower  bound  is  S.  The  upper  bound  SW  depends  on  the
extinction  penalty  and  on  the  immediate  extinction  risk.  Processes  initiated
above  the  equilibrium  interval  converge  to  Sm  rather  than  to  S.  This  behavior
manifests  how  the  economic  value  of preservation,  as  well  as  our  partial  ignorance
of the  associated  ecology,  should  affect  the  way  we  deal  with  our  natural
resources.
The  choice  of the  appropriate  value  of the  extinction  penalty  allows  for  the
great  flexibility  of the  model  under  study.  Its  limiting  values  correspond  to the
extreme  views  that preservation  must  be  guaranteed  at all  cost,  or conversely,
that  only  direct  human  benefits  should  determine  exploitation  policies.  For  a
sound  discussion  of concrete  situations,  a  rationale  evaluation  of the  extinction
penalty  is  clearly  called  for.
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19Appendix  A:  Monotonicity  of  the state  processes
In  this  appendix  we  consider  the  monotonicity  properties  of the  optimal  state
processes  associated  with  the  various  optimization  problems  introduced  in  Section
2.  For  each  of these  problems,  we  show
Proposition  (Monotonicity):  At  least  one  of the  optimal  state  trajectories
evolves  monotonically  in time.
The  proposition  implies  that  if any  of the  optimization  problems  (2.2),  (2.4)  or
(2.7)  admits  a  unique  solution,  the  corresponding  state  process  must  be  monotonic.
For problems  with multiple  solutions,  at  least  one  solution  must  be  monotonic.
Proof:  We  begin  with  the  simpler  post-event  and  auxiliary  problems.  Consider
first the  case  in  which  the  optimal  trajectory  corresponding  to  (2.2) or  (2.7)  is
unique.  Suppose  that  St  is  not  monotonic.  For  concreteness,  consider  three
distinct  time  values,  t,  <  m  <  t2,  such  that  Sq  <  Sm and  St  <  Sm.  Since  St  is
time-continuous,  there  must  exist  some  t3  e  (t,,m),  at  which  St  increases,  and
some  t  e  (m,t2),  at  which  St decreases,  such  that  St3  =  St4.  However,  Y,  C,  R,  F
and  p  do  not  depend  on  t explicitly,  hence  the  same  decision  problem  is
encountered  at  t3  and  at  t . Thus,  one  cannot  arrive  at  conflicting  decisions
concerning  the  sign  of gt-R(S)  at  these  times,  since  the  optimality  of both
decisions  violates  the  uniqueness  of the  optimal  plan.  This  argument  applies  also
when  Sm  corresponds  to  a  minimum  rather  than  to  a  maximum.
For problems  with  multiple  optima,  some  optimal  S  trajectory  may  not  be
monotonic.  We  shall  show,  however,  that  it  is  possible  to  construct  a  monotonic
plan  from  a  non-monotonic  one.  Observe,  first,  that  the  optimality  of the
decisions  at  t3  and  t4  implies  that  one can  choose  either  gt3  or g 4 at  t3  and  t4
and  obtain  the  same  value.  Furthermore,  this  freedom  of choice  prevails  at  any
20state  level  between  St3  and  Sm.  Thus,  the  existence  of a  local  extremum  of S
implies  the  existence  of a  continuum  of feasible  plans,  all  yielding  the  optimal
value.  To  construct  a  monotonic  plan,  one  specifies,  for  any  state  S permitting
several  optimal  diversion  rates,  a  particular  selection  rule  to  ensure  that
whenever  S is  encountered,  the  same  diversion  rate  is  adopted.  For example,  one
can  demand  that  among  the  optimal  diversion  rates,  the  minimal  optimal  diversion
rate  is  selected.  The  ensuing  plan  is  optimal  and  monotonic,  because  non-
monotonic  plans  involve  conflicting  choices  of diversion  rates  at  the  same  state
levels.
The  uncertainty  problem  (2.4) differs  from  the  post-event  and  auxiliary
problems  in  that  decisions  may  depend  on  history.  This  means  that passing  through
the  same  state  at  different  times  may  lead  to  conflicting  decisions.
Nevertheless,  we  show  that  monotonicity  is preserved.
Consider  again  problems  admitting  a  unique  solution,  and  observe  that  no  new
information  is  gained  (i.e.,  St  =  Min {S,}  does  not  change)  while  passing
TE [0,t]
through  a  local  maximum.  Thus,  the  argument  used  above  applies,  implying  that  a
local  maximum  conflicts  with  the  assumption  of a  unique  solution,  and  once  St
starts  increasing,  it cannot  decrease  at  later  times.
The  analysis  of a  possible  local  minimum  is more  involved.  Suppose  that
diversion  exceeds  recharge  at  t3  <  m  but  falls  short  of recharge  at t4  >  m,  yet
St  =  St4  and  Sm  is the  minimum  level  obtained  during  [t  ,t4].  Although  the  state
level  is  the  same,  the  decision  problems  at  t  and  t  may  differ,  since  St4  =  S  <
St 3. To rule  out  such  situations,  observe  first  that  since  local  maxima  are
excluded,  the  local  minimum  Sm  is,  in  fact,  a  global  minimum.  We  can  also
restrict  attention  to  minima  satisfying  Sm  >  S,  where  S is  the  state  level  at
which  the  event  is  bound  to  occur.  This  is  so  because  monotonicity  refers  only  to
21the  pre-event  component  of the  uncertainty  plan  and  by  the  time  S  is  reached,  the
event  will  have  occurred  with probability  one.  Thus  if Sm  5  S,  the  pre-event
trajectory  is  trivially  monotonic.
Let  S* and  gt  represent  the  optimal  processes  corresponding  to  the  uncertainty
problem  (2.4),  and  p(S)  =  VP(S)-t  be  the  value  at the  occurrence  date  T if  the
critical  level  turns  out  to  equal  S.  The  pre-event  value  is
T
V(S)  =  Er{[Y(g)-C(St)g]e-ptdt  +  e-PT  p(S)  T  T>  ,
00
while  U(S)  =  [Y(gt)-C(St)gt]e-Ptdt  is  the  benefit  associated  with the
0
uninterrupted  plan.  In  the  expressions  for  V(S)  and  U(S),  time  is  measured
relative  to  the  passage  time  through  the  state  level  S.  For  notational
convenience  we  suppress  the  possible  explicit  time  dependence  of U  and  V
representing  differences  in  histories  and  future  plans  as  S  is  encountered  at
different  times.  We  now  show  that  if the  process  St  is  not  designed  to reach  S,
then  unintentional  occurrence  cannot  be  advantageous,  that  is
Lemma  Al:  If Inf{St}  >  S,  then  U(S)  2  V(S).
proof:  The  relation  among  the  benefit  measures  is  expressed  as
00  00
V(S)= Ef  [Y(gt)-C(St)g]e'P tdt+e-PT{p(S)- f[(gI+T)-C(S  tT)gt]e-ptdt}TT> 0)
o  0
or
V(S)  =  U(S)  +  Fe-ePT[p(S)  - U(S  )]T>o}.  (Al)
Since  the  plan corresponding  to  VP(S)  is  feasible,  V(S)  >  p(S),  which  together
with  (Al)  implies  U(S)  +  ETe{PTkp(Sq)  - U(S)]  T>. >  Ž  p(S).  In  terms  of
0(S)  =  U(S)  - qp(S),  this  result  is  written  as
229(S)  Ere-pT  )(S*) T > 0}.  (A2)
Define  0  =  Inf  {0(S*)}.  Clearly,  the  lemma  follows  from  (Al)  if we  show  that
tE [o,oo]
0  2  0.  For every  e  >  0  there  exists  some  time  q  for  which  0(S*)  <  0  +  e.
Inequality  (A2)  applies  for  every  S  along  the  optimal  plan.  In particular,  for  S*
it  implies  that  9(S)  EePT(Sq+T)I T> 0  OE e-piT I  T> 0.  In terms  of
dq  E=eePT  T>0  <  1, this  results  reduces  to  9(1-dq)  >  -s.  Since  the  state
process  never  comes  too close  to  S,  dq  does  not  approach  unity  as  e  - 0.
Moreover,  since  s  can  be  made  arbitrarily  small,  it  follows  that  0  >  0.0
This  result can  be  used  to  eliminate  the  possibility  of a  local  minimum  by
comparing  the  benefit  expected  from  the  four  feasible  plans:
a)  S33,  starting  at  t  and  following  the  path  S*  ;  (optimal).
b)  S34,  starting  at t3  and  following  the  path  S*  ; (suboptimal). t  3  t+t4
c)  S43,  starting  at t  and  following  the  path  S*  ; (suboptimal).
t  4  t +t 3
d)  S44,  starting  at  t  and  following  the  path  S*  ;  (optimal).
t  4  t+t 4
Note  that  the  time  index  t  of  SiJ  measures  the  time  elapsed  from  the
corresponding  start  time  t..  In  fact,  S 33  =  S 43  for  all  t,  and  the  two plans
I  t  t
differ  only  with  respect  to  the  prior  information  involved:  S 4 3  =  Sm  and  S43  is
t  t
carried  out  knowing  that  the  event  will  never  occur,  whereas  S33  >  Sm  and  S33  is
0  t
planned  under  the  risk  that  it  will  be  interrupted  by  an  event  before  the  minimum
level  Sm is  arrived  at.
Let  V(Sii)  denote  the  benefit  expected  from  each  path,  evaluated  at  its  start
time  t..  Judging  by  the  decisions  taken,  V(S33)  >  V(S34) and  V(S44)  >  V(S43).  We
also  know  that  S34  =  S44  and  these  paths  are  increasing,  hence  V(S34)  =  V(S").
t  t
(For  increasing  plans  the  probability  of non-occurrence  reduces  to  unity  and  does
not  affect  the  value.)  It follows  that  V(S33)  >  V(S43).  However,  V(S33)  =  V(St3)
23while  V(S4 3)  =  U(St3), hence  the  latter  inequality  contradicts  Lemma  Al.
For problems  admitting  multiple  optima,  the  strong  inequalities  of the
previous  paragraph  may  be  replaced  by  equalities,  and  the  non-monotonic  plan
cannot  be  ruled  out.  Yet,  the  construction  of a  monotonic  optimal  path  from  this
non-monotonic  plan  follows  the  discussion  of the  post-event  and  the  auxiliary
problems:  One  chooses  a  selection  rule  according  to  which,  for  each  state  level,
a  particular  diversion  rate  is chosen  among  all  optimal  rates.  The  resulting
optimal  plan  is monotonic,  because  conflicting  decision  at  the  same  state  levels
are  not  allowed.,
Appendix  B:  Properties of  the  Post-Event  Plan
The  current-value  Hamiltonian  and  Lagrangian  functions  corresponding  to  the
post  event  problem  (2.2)  are
H(St,gt,Pt,t) =  Y(g)  - C(St)gt  +  pt[R(St)-gt]
and
£(St,8t,Ptaty,t), =  H(St,gt,Pt,t) +  ytgt  +  aSt
where  Pt  is the  current  value  costate  variable,  and  Yt  and  at  are  the  current
value  Lagrange  multipliers  associated  with  the  constraints  gt 2  0  and  St  2  0.
Denoting  optimal  quantities  by  the  superscript  p,  the  necessary  conditions  include
(Arrow  and  Kurz,  1970,  pp.  48-49):  a  /ag  =  0,  giving
Y'(gp)  - C(St  =  p, - Y,  (Bl)
and  pt-ppt  =  -a-t/aSt,  yielding
Pt  =  t[p-R'(St)]  +  C'(St)g t  - a, .   (B2)
The  slackness  conditions  read:
y, > 0, a,  0,  ygt =  0,  atSt  =  0.  (B3)
Using  (B1)  to  eliminate  Pt  from  (B2),  we  obtain
Pt  =  [Y'(gt)-C(St) +Y,]  [p-R'(S't)]  +  gtC'(SZ)  - a,,  (B4)
24which  reduces,  since  g P =  R(S)  - SP,  to
Pt  =  {-C'(SP)-[p-R(SP)]Y"(g)}$S  +  L(SP)  +  y,[p-R'(SP)]  - at.  (B5)
In  (B5)  g  is  some  value  between  gP and  R(SP),  L(S)  =  [p-R'(S)][Y'(R(S))-C(S)-J(S)]
and  J(S)  =  -C'(S)R(S)/[p-R'(S)],  as  defined  in  Section  3.  For an equilibrium
state  S,  p  and  S must  vanish  and  (B5)  implies
L(S)  +  y[p-R'(S)]  - a  =  0,  (B6)
from  which,  using  (B3),  Property  3.1  is  deduced.
Next,  we  derive  a  first-order  differential  equation  for  the  optimal  process
whose  solution permits  the  evaluation  of the  value  function  VP(S).  For
simplicity,  we  consider  the  case  of an  interior  equilibrium  point,  so  that  L(S)  =
a  =  y  =  0.  Taking  the  time  derivative  of  (B1),  we  obtain
Y"(g)g  - C'(SP)SP  =  pt.  (B7)
Comparing  with  (B4)  we  find
Y"(gt)g  =  [Y'(gP)-C(SP)][p-R'(SP)]  +  R(SP)C'(S).  (B8)
As  the  problem  is  autonomous,  gP  can  be  expressed  as  a  function  of S  only:
gP  =  gP(S).  With  gPF(S)  dgP/dS  and  gP  =  gP'(S)[R(S)-gP],  (B8)  is  rewritten  as
gP'(S)  = L(S)  +  [Y'(gP)-Y'(R(S))][p-R'(S)]  (B9)
Y"(gP)[R(S)-gP]
The  boundary  condition  associated  with  (B9)  is  gP(S)  =  R(S).  Note  that  (B9)  is
not  singular  at  S,  because  the  numerator  also  vanishes  at  this  state.  Indeed,
taking  the  limit  S  - S,  the  right-hand  side  of (B9)  reduces  to
L'(S)/{Y"(R(S))[R'(S)-g P'(S)]}  - [p-R'(S)].  Solving  for  gP'(S)-R'(S),  noting  that
this  quantity  must  be  positive  to  allow  the  equilibrium  level  S to  attract the
optimal  state  process,  we  find
gP'(S)  =  R'(S)  +  •  p2  - 4L'(S)/Y"(R(S))  - pJ.  (B10)
With  (B10)  providing  the  starting  step,  (B9)  is  conveniently  treated  numerically.
25Once  (B9)  is  solved  for  gP(S),  S' can  be  determined  via
SI  dS s
t  =  f  d(B11)
J  R(S)-gP(S)
Given  gP(S)  and  using  VP'(S)  =  p(S)  =  the  costate  variable  at  the  passage  time
through  S  (see,  e.g.,  Arrow  and  Kurz,  1970,  p.  35),  the  post-event  value  function
VP(S)  can  be  evaluated  from  the  Dynamic  Programming  relation
pVP(S)  =  Y(gP(S))-C(S)gP(S)  +  VP'(S)[R(S)-gP(S)]
=  Y(gP(S))-C(S)gP(S)  +  [Y'(gP(S))-C(S)][R(S)-gP(S)].  (B12)
Our  next  task  is  to  establish  the  monotonicity  of the  implicit  penalty
VP(S)-W(S)  for  S  >  S,  as  stated  in  relation  (3.5).  Since  the  steady-state  policy
is  always  available,  VP(S)  2  W(S),  equality  holding  at  the  equilibrium  state  S.
Thus,  VP'(S)  =  W'(S).  With  pW(S)  =  Y(R(S))  - C(S)R(S),  we  find
pW'(S)  =  [Y'(R(S))-C(S)]R'(S)  - R(S)C'(S)  =  L(S)R'(S)/[p-R'(S)]  +  pJ(S).
Since  L(S)  >  0  for  S  >  S and  R'(S)  5  0,
W'(S)  5  J(S)  for  all  S  >  S.  (B13)
We  now  show  that
p(S)  2 J(S)  for  all  S  >  S,  (B14)
where  it  is  recalled  that  p(S)  is  the  costate  value  at the  passage  time  through  S.
From  (B2)-(B3)  we  find
Pt  =  p,[p-R'(SP)]  +  C'(SP)g p   =  [p-R'(S)][pt-J(S)]  - C'(S)[R(S)-g]
or
d[pt+C(SP)]/dt  =  [p-R'(StP)[pt-J(SP)].  (B15)
The  optimal  state  process  that  departs  from  S  >  S must decrease  (cf.  Property
3.1),  hence  C(SP)  and  J(SP) cannot  decrease.  Suppose  that  po  =  p(S)  <  J(S).
According  to  (B15),  p,+C(S')  decreases  with  time,  hence  p, must  decrease.  It
follows  that  the  (initially  positive)  difference  J(SP)-pt  cannot  shrink  as  S(
26approaches  S.  In  particular,  J(S)  >  po  p(S).  But  according  to  (Bl),  at  S we
must  have  po  >  J(S),  equality  holding  if S  >  0.  Hence,  p(S)  2  J(S)  as  stated  by
(B14).  Recalling  that  VP'(S)  =  p(S),  (B13)  and  (B14)  imply  (3.5),
Another  interesting  consequence  of (B15)  is  the  monotonicity  of the  control
variable  gP  (to  be  distinguished  from  the  monotonicity  of the  state  SP).  As
gt  >  0  at  S  >  S,  (Bl) and  (B15)  give  dY'(gP)/dt  =  [p-R'(SP)][pt-J(SP)]  0,
implying  (since  Y  is  strictly  concave)  that  gP  cannot  increase  with  time.  One  can
establish,  in  a  similar  manner,  that  gP  cannot  decrease  along  processes  initiated
at  S  <  S.
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